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CASE COMMENTS
the Civil Rights Acts apparently will be applied whenever a public
officer exceeds his authority.
Hazel Armenta Straub
Income Tax-Corporate Reorganizations-Spin-offs
A corporation had been engaged in the manufacture and sale of
agricultural machinery for several years. Most of its business was
concentrated in the Midwest, and it had been conducting operations
in the Northeast for only three years. The corporation formed a
subsidiary and transferred all of the assets used in its Northeastern
operations to the subsidiary. The subsidiary took over all opera-
tions formerly conducted by the parent in the Northeast, and the
parent immediately ceased all operations in that part of the country.
One month after the new corporation was formed the parent
corporation distributed to its stockholders all of its stock in the
subsidiary. There were valid business reasons for the entire trans-
action, and tax avoidance was not a motivating factor. The Tax
Court held that receipt of the stock constituted taxable income to
the stockholders. Held, reversed. This transaction met all the
requisites for a tax-free distribution under section 355 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner,
350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965).
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 represents the
main statutory provision for the non-recognition of gain or loss at
the shareholder level when there is a corporate divisive reorganiza-
tion and a distribution of stock or securities made by the corpora-
tion to the shareholders. Corporate reorganizations under section
355 have been classified as "spin-offs," "split-offs" and "split-ups."
The Code does not use these terms, and there is no official sanction
for this classification. These three types of reorganization are dis-
cussed in Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952). A spin-off
occurs when assets of a corporation are transferred to a subsidiary
corporation and the stock or securities in the subsidiary are dis-
tributed to the shareholders of the parent corporation without a
surrender of stock or securities by the shareholders. In a split-off
the shareholders surrender a part of their stock or securities in the
parent corporation for stock or securities of a subsidiary corporation.
A split-up occurs when the parent corporation transfers its assets
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to two or more newly formed corporations in exchange for their
stock and securities and then liquidates the parent. The share-
holders receive stock or stock and debt securities in the new cor-
porations in exchange for the parent corporation's stock.
Corporate reorganization is a convenient device for facilitating
business transactions, but it also is susceptible to abuse by tax-
payers. A shareholder who receives a distribution from the earnings
and profits of a corporation is taxed at ordinary income rates on
the amount of the dividend. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301. If,
however, a corporation can segregate unwanted assets into a sub-
sidiaiy corporation and distribute the subsidiary's stock to the
parent's shareholders without a taxable gain to them, the share-
holders can realize earnings and profits at capital gain rates either
by selling the new stock, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1003,
1201(b), 1202, 1221, or by liquidating the second corporation,
INT. RnV. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
Thus the real problem is how tax avoidance can be prevented
without forbidding reorganizations which are motivated by valid
business reasons. To meet this problem, Congress enacted section
355 (and its predecessors) which provides for non-recognition of
gain on certain qualifying distributions.
Prior to 1924 a distribution to stockholders pursuant to a spin-
off was taxed as a dividend. The stock distributed was considered
to represent an interest in a new and different corporation from
the one in which the shareholder originally had invested. As the
shareholder was considered to have received something different
in the form of an exchangeable asset, it was therefore a "realization"
of income on the original investment. Rockefeller v. United States,
257 U.S. 176 (1921). From 1924 to 1932, the revenue acts changed
position and provided that spin-offs could be tax-free. From 1934
to 1950 tax-free spin-offs were again abolished due to flagrant
abuse by taxpayers. Because of the usefulness of the spin-off
device in the achievement of corporate growth and flexibility,
Congress again accorded it tax-free status in 1951. INT. Bi¢. CODE
OF 1939, § 112(b)11, added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452 (1951). At
that time certain conditions were imposed to prevent any abuse
from the use of this device. In 1954 the tax-free spin-off was
continued as section 355 with some additional tax avoidance safe-
guards which included the five-year active business requirement
involved in the principal case.
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The principal requirements which must be met to qualify for
tax-free treatment under section 355 are as follows: (1) The
transaction cannot be used principally as a device to distribute
profits. (2) The distributing corporation must distribute either
all the stock or securities that it held in the controlled corporation
immediately before the distribution or an amount of stock which
is sufficient to constitute control. (3) Retention by the distributing
corporation of part of the stock must not be for the principal pur-
pose of tax avoidance. (4) Immediately after the distribution both
the parent and the subsidiary corporation must be engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business, and the trade or business
must have been conducted actively for five years immediately
preceding the distribution.
On the basis of the amount of litigation, it appears that the most
important test and the most severe one, is the five year active busi-
ness requirement. Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held that the active
business requirement is not satisfied if the parent merges and
terminates its existence at the time of the spin-off. Continuation of
the merged parent corporation's business under the subsidiary is
not enough. Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
In W. E. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545 (1964), rejecting
the Commissioner's position that the parent or subsidiary had
to have a five year history, the court said that the trade or business
could have been conducted by a third party for the requisite period.
The Commissioner at one time contended that the five year active
business requirement was met only if both the parent and sub-
sidiary had been in existence for five years immediately preceding
distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955). This argument was
rejected by the courts in United States v. Marett, 325 F.2d 28
(5th Cir. 1963), and Commissioner v. Coady, 289 F.2d 490 (6th
Cir. 1961). These cases held that tax-free treatment under section
355 will not be denied simply because the transaction is an attempt
to divide a single trade or business. The court in the Coady case
based its holding on a literal reading of the statute and noted the
absence of any indication that Congress intended something other
than a literal interpretation. The Commissioner has acquiesced in
these holdings, 1964-1 Cum. BuLr. 136, although the regulations
have not yet been amended to reflect this change in position.
Despite the Commissioner's acquiesence in the holdings of Marett
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and Coady, he reiterated the argument in the principal case that
both the parent and the subsidiary must have been in existence
for five years prior to the distribution. It is difficult to understand
the Commissioner's logic in contending that the principal case was
not governed by his acquiesence in Coady and Marett. Whatever
may have been his reasoning, the court summarily dismissed the
argument and agreed with Marett and Coady.
The Commissioner also contended that the parent corporation
in the principal case had not met the five year business requirement
in the Northeast, i.e., the geographic area in which the subsidiary
corporation had been doing business. The court dispelled this
avenue of attack by stating that in the absence of an expression
of congressional intent to the contrary, the test is whether the dis-
tributing corporation, for five years prior to distribution, had been
actively conducting the type of business presently performed by
the controlled corporation without reference to geographic area.
The requirements of section 355 will be satisfied even though
there has been a change in trade or business during the five year
period, provided the changes were not of such a character as to
constitute the acquisition of a new or different business. This is
in substantial accord with Treas. Reg. § 1.355-4(b)3 (1955), and
P. W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
The court in the principal case stated that if, just prior to dis-
tribution, the parent had acquired or opened a new or entirely
different aspect of its business unrelated to prior activities and had
spun this off, a different result might have ensued. This cautionary
expression is supported by the holding in Bonsafl v. Commissioner,
317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963). There a corporation attempted to
spin-off stock of a subsidiary corporation which recently had
acquired a rental business from the parent corporation. The Second
Circuit said that the rental activity was merely an incidental part
of the sole business of the controlling corporation, and, as the
rental business had not been carried on for the requisite five year
period, the tax-free spin-off was disallowed.
Many questions remain unanswered in this troublesome area
of stock distributions following corporate reorganizations. Never-
theless, through several years of administration, litigation and
amendment, section 355 has evolved into an extremely useful and
quite workable device. As it is presently written and interpreted,
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it appears to afford a large degree of flexibility in the realignment
of corporate affairs, while at the same time containing adequate
safeguards against its use merely to avoid taxes.
Raymond Albert Hinerman
Property-Involuntary Partition of Jointly Owned Property
P and D were husband and wife who took title to land by a deed
which provided that they hold,
... as joint tenants with right of survivorship . . . it being
the intention of the parties . .. that (unless the joint tenancy
hereby created is severed or terminated during the joint lives
of the grantees herein) . . . the entire interest in fee simple
shall pass to the surviving grantee ....
P filed a bill seeking to have the property sold for division, and the
trial court ordered the property sold. Held, reversed. During the
joint lives of the parties the property was not saleable for division
over the objection of either party. Bernhard v. Bernhard, 177 So. 2d
565 (Ala. 1965).
Partition had its origin in the common law courts, and the purpose
of the preceeding is to enable those who own property as joint
tenants or coparcerners or tenanats in common to put an end to
the tenancy in order to vest in each a specific property or an
allotment of the lands or tenements. 4 THomvmsoN, REAL PRoPERTY
§ § 1781, 1822 (1961).
A suit for partition can be maintained only by a party or parties
having a title or equity in an interest in the whole of the property
to be divided. Pierce v. Pierce 4 MI. 2d 497, 123 N.E.2d 511 (1954).
Thus, a remainderman cannot maintain such an action. Hartman
v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958). A tenant for life is
not entitled to maintain partition against reversioners, remainder-
men or others having a future conditional interest. Fehringer v.
Fehringer, 212 Term 75, 367 S.W.2d 719 (1963). The law concern-
ing partition of property in which there is an interest in remainder
is correctly stated in the principal case; however, there is some
question as to whether there was in fact any interest in remainder
involved in this case.
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